Sketches for a Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social Function of Property by Davidson, Nestor M.
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 80 Issue 3 Article 3 
December 2011 
Sketches for a Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social Function of 
Property 
Nestor M. Davidson 
Fordham University School of Law 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nestor M. Davidson, Sketches for a Hamiltonian Vernacular as a Social Function of Property, 80 Fordham 
L. Rev. 1053 (2011). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol80/iss3/3 
This Symposium is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship 
and History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The 
Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact 
tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
 1053 
SKETCHES FOR A HAMILTONIAN VERNACULAR 
AS A SOCIAL FUNCTION OF PROPERTY 
Nestor M. Davidson*
INTRODUCTION 
 
When Léon Duguit laid out his concept of the social function of property 
in his Buenos Aires lectures a century ago, he had in mind not only the 
general idea that ownership entails obligation, but also a quite specific kind 
of affirmative duty.  To Duguit, the particular role that owners play in 
society requires that they put their property to productive use for the sake of 
social solidarity.1  If owners fail to live up to this developmental 
imperative, Duguit argued, the state can enforce a mandate to do so as it 
would any other internal aspect of property law.2
Although scholars in the United States have explored versions of the 
social function of property, the vision that emerges from this nascent 
discourse tends to ground the obligations of ownership in conceptions of 
shared sacrifice and interpersonal reliance.
 
3
Understandings of the social function that parallel the particular texture 
of Duguit’s productive obligation, however, have received less attention in 
the United States.  This is curious, because one of the earliest and strongest 
conceptions of ownership in the United States reflected just this kind of 
developmental norm.  Like Duguit’s social solidarity, the common law 
conception that property rights must foster the good of the community 
  These are undeniably 
important and under-appreciated currents in the jurisprudence, highlighting 
both the relational nature of property rights as well as the adaptability of the 
common law principle of sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas that property 
rights are limited by the obligation not to use property to harm others. 
 
*  Associate Professor, Fordham University School of Law.  The author wishes to thank 
Sheila Foster and Daniel Bonilla for organizing the symposium for which this Essay was 
written, and the participants in that symposium for helpful and enlightening discussion. 
 1. See LÉON DUGUIT, LES TRANSFORMATIONS GÉNÉRALES DU DROIT PRIVÉ DEPUIS LE 
CODE NAPOLÉON [CHANGES OF PRINCIPLE IN THE FIELD OF LIBERTY, CONTRACT, LIABILITY, 
AND PROPERTY] (1912), translated in THE PROGRESS OF CONTINENTAL LAW IN THE 
NINETEENTH CENTURY 75 (Joseph H. Drake et al. eds., Thomas S. Bell et al. trans., 1918). 
 2. Id. at 133–34.  For overviews of Duguit’s articulation of the social function of 
property, see generally Sheila R. Foster & Daniel Bonilla, Introduction to The Social 
Function of Property:  A Comparative Perspective, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1003 (2011); M.C. 
Mirow, The Social-Obligation Norm of Property:  Duguit, Hayem, and Others, 22 FLA. J. 
INT’L L. 191 (2010). 
 3. See generally Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 745 (2009); Joseph William Singer, The Reliance 
Interest in Property, 40 STAN. L. REV. 611 (1988). 
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reflected in the equally hoary maxim salus populi suprema lex—the welfare 
of the people is supreme—had what historian William Fisher describes as a 
“meaningful and powerful” influence on property law in the era between 
the Revolution and the Civil War.4  The conception of welfare that the salus 
populi demanded quite often affirmatively required owners to actively use 
property, and correspondingly supported an affirmative state role in social 
ordering through private property to set the terms of that developmental 
imperative.5
This productivity-oriented social function contrasts in many ways with 
two other conceptions of property that continue to frame the modern U.S. 
discourse.
 
6  The first is the possessive–individualist tradition centered on 
market property that reflects the classical liberal absolutism against which 
Duguit was reacting.7  The second conception is a civic republican tradition 
that emphasizes property’s role in promoting civic virtue and ensuring 
social order.8  Although these conceptions are far from hermetic, and 
interact throughout U.S. history, a third tradition has been explicitly 
entrepreneurial in that it relies on market forces, but has not venerated 
vested rights as an overarching bar to disrupting existing market structures.9
Conceptions of property rights in the United States that trace back to the 
earliest days of the Republic are often associated—approvingly or 
disparagingly—with members of the Founding generation, in symbolic 
gestures that, for all of their reductionism, serve to highlight their 
provenance and continuity.
 
10  Thus, for example, Jennifer Nedelsky 
associates the classical liberal view with James Madison,11 although 
Madison’s views on property were, like most of his contemporaries, 
varied.12  Similarly, the contrapuntal civic republican tradition is often 
traced to Thomas Jefferson’s yeoman vision,13 although, again, Jefferson 
held views on property that are not easy to reduce to a monistic vision.14
 
 4. William W. Fisher III, Making Sense of Madison:  Nedelsky on Private Property, 19 
LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 547, 555 (1993).  For a general discussion of the salus populi principle 
and its role in early U.S. property, see WILLIAM J. NOVAK, THE PEOPLE’S WELFARE:  LAW 
AND REGULATION IN NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA (1996). 
 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 69–90. 
 6. See generally GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, COMMODITY AND PROPRIETY:  COMPETING 
VISIONS OF PROPERTY IN AMERICAN LEGAL THOUGHT 1776–1970 (1997). 
 7. See id. at 12. 
 8. Id. at 13. 
 9. See id. at 185–210. 
 10. Cf. Robert Hockett, A Jeffersonian Republic by Hamiltonian Means:  Values, 
Constraints, and Finance in the Design of a Comprehensive and Contemporary American 
“Ownership Society,” 79 S. CAL. L. REV. 45, 45–48 (2005) (discussing the contemporary 
relevance of Founding-era concepts of property and society). 
 11. JENNIFER NEDELSKY, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE LIMITS OF AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTIONALISM:  THE MADISONIAN FRAMEWORK AND ITS LEGACY 185–87, 207–08 
(1990). 
 12. See Fisher, supra note 4, at 555. 
 13. See, e.g., Stanley N. Katz, Thomas Jefferson and the Right to Property in 
Revolutionary America, 19 J.L. & ECON. 467, 470 (1976). 
 14. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 41–42. 
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With caution, then, about the challenge of translating from the foreign 
country that is the past,15 it is possible to link elements of the salus populi 
productive norm in early U.S. property law to a third, and less often 
invoked, member of the Founding generation:  Alexander Hamilton.16
Hamilton, as befits the breadth of his views, is often associated with the 
individualist–commodity view of property,
  
Hamilton, the first U.S. Treasury Secretary, laid the foundation for an active 
state that would create the conditions for a modern industrial economy.  
More than any other of his contemporaries, Hamilton harnessed an 
awakening national government to spur development and establish financial 
markets.  Hamilton did so, however, in ways that sublimated individual 
initiative to the good of a nascent national community. 
17 and there is much to this 
association.18  Conversely, there is a republican strain of social ordering in 
much of the embodiment of the Hamiltonian perspective that followed in 
the first decades of the nineteenth century, albeit more a commercial than a 
civic strain.19  It is possible, however, to understand this tradition as 
Willard Hurst and other historians have, as a distinctive U.S. cultural 
development that sought to harness the energy of the individual to increase 
the common wealth.20  The corresponding vision of property was less 
focused on freedom from the state in the classical liberal sense or 
limitations on ownership that flow from harm-focused equal liberty 
reflected in sic utere.  Rather it sought to put property to its highest and best 
use for the benefit of the community, with corresponding doctrines that 
resolved disputes less in favor of vested rights than in ways that tended to 
increase development.21  Hamilton’s entrepreneurial vision of a vigorous 
state unleashing and harnessing individual initiative for the common good 
thus inverted Adam Smith’s invisible hand and its corresponding minimal, 
contractualist state.22
This approach to the obligations of ownership has been obscured to some 
extent in the contemporary discourse, but nonetheless recurs—with 
ambivalence—in the doctrine.  To give one example, this kind of 
 
 
 15. Cf. Martin S. Flaherty, History “Lite” in Modern American Constitutionalism, 95 
COLUM. L. REV. 523, 525–26 (1995) (aptly warning about historical claims that have 
reductive simplicity). 
 16. See James Willard Hurst, Alexander Hamilton, Law Maker, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 483, 
483–84 (1978). 
 17. See, e.g., Arthur McEvoy, Markets and Ethics in U.S. Property Law, in WHO OWNS 
AMERICA?  SOCIAL CONFLICT OVER PROPERTY RIGHTS 94, 96 (Harvey Jacobs ed., 1991); see 
also ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 77 (describing Hamilton’s Report on Public Credit as 
“pure commodity thought”). 
 18. See WILLIAM B. SCOTT, IN PURSUIT OF HAPPINESS:  AMERICAN CONCEPTIONS OF 
PROPERTY FROM THE SEVENTEENTH TO THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 74 (1977). 
 19. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 12–13. 
 20. See infra text accompanying notes 69–90. 
 21. JAMES WILLARD HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH 
CENTURY UNITED STATES 9 (1956). 
 22. See CLINTON ROSSITER, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE CONSTITUTION 179 (1964) 
(“The release of individual energies was so important to bring about that [Hamilton] 
preferred the open hand of authority rather than the hidden hand of chance to hold the 
lever.”). 
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developmental imperative formed an important backdrop to the affirmation 
of the role of eminent domain in economic development upheld in Kelo v. 
City of New London.23  Beyond individual disputes, active state ordering of 
property to enhance development is reflected in a variety of current 
initiatives at all levels of government that go beyond setting what Joseph 
Singer has called the “minimum standards.”24  These initiatives, as 
Hamilton’s policies did, invest in the predicates for active ownership, such 
as infrastructure and education.  Thus, when historian Richard Wright 
recently criticized proposals for a national high-speed rail initiative by 
disparagingly invoking the federal government’s nineteenth century 
promotion of the transcontinental railroad,25
This historical ground has been well plowed, but is worth revisiting as 
interest in the social function of property is beginning to make the leap from 
Europe to Latin America to the United States.  This Essay, accordingly, re-
examines the Hamiltonian legacy, not to mount a normative defense of the 
tradition, but rather to highlight its relevance to a comparative 
understanding of the social function.  The Essay begins with a discussion of 
the methodological implications of social function theory, focusing on 
Duguit’s empiricism.  It then turns to Hamilton’s vision as an antecedent to 
the commonwealth norm in antebellum jurisprudence, which might be 
understood as a distinctive vernacular understanding of the productivity 
obligation that Duguit associated with ownership.  The Essay concludes by 
noting echoes of this obligation in contemporary debates about private 
property and the role of the state in defining the institution. 
 it was a timely reminder not 
only of the endurance of this vision of property, but of the controversies it 
generates. 
I.  METHODOLOGICAL ROOTS:  
THE VERNACULAR IN THE SOCIAL FUNCTION 
Methodologically, classic liberal conceptions of property tend to reflect a 
hierarchy of values and assertions about the division between the state and 
the individual embodied in property that ignores history and culture.  If 
property is understood as a pre-political, natural right, that understanding in 
turn assumes that there is one overriding purpose for property, with a 
normative function of shielding individual liberty from the state.  This is a 
moral framework largely abstracted from the practical reality of how 
property is lived and was part of what Duguit was reacting to in his critique 
of property as a subjective right.26
 
 23. 545 U.S. 469 (2005). 
  It carries a corresponding understanding 
of the interaction between the individual and the state instantiated through 
property that likewise obscures context.  Indeed, what is striking about 
 24. See generally Joseph W. Singer, Things that We Would Like to Take for Granted:  
Minimum Standards for the Legal Framework of a Free and Democratic Society, 2 HARV. L. 
& POL’Y REV. 139 (2008). 
 25. See Richard Wright, Fast Train to Nowhere, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 24, 2011, at WK9. 
 26. See Foster & Bonilla, supra note 2, at 1005–06 (discussing Duguit’s empiricism). 
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descriptions of property in classic liberal terms is the not infrequent 
assertion of universality and absoluteness.27
By contrast, as a methodological matter, social function theory inherently 
recognizes the pluralism of what Hanoch Dagan recently called “property 
institutions.”
 
28  An emphasis on the social in property’s function, by 
definition, makes clear that what society may require of an owner is always 
grounded in a particular culture and specific social, economic, and political 
conditions.  As Duguit noted in his Buenos Aires lecture, “I am of those 
who think that law is much less the work of the legislator than the constant 
and spontaneous product of events,” and that by “the nature of things and 
the force of events and practical needs new legal conceptions are constantly 
forming.”29  Duguit’s approach to property was thus self-consciously 
empirical, seeking to divine legal rules from social reality.30
In this way, the social function of property can be thought of as a found 
object, with distinctive, local, often unmediated understandings embodied 
in law.  This legal residue is akin to the way that vernacular architecture 
uses local resources to represent spontaneous, contextual responses to local 
conditions.  As Frank Lloyd Wright noted, such architecture grows “in 
response to actual needs, fitted into environment by people who [know] no 
better than to fit them with native feeling.”
 
31  Vernacularity thus 
emphasizes indigenous solutions to common design problems, resulting in a 
“strong community identity . . . that is manifest in distinctive qualities and 
results in recognized patterns of everyday language.”32  Such architecture 
reflects organically generated responses to local conditions,33 “‘on the 
principal criteria of expression of site and climate, expression of form and 
function, expression of materials and skills.’”34
This is a fruitful metaphor for the equally organic response to political, 
economic, and cultural forces that guide the development of the social 
 
 
 27. See, e.g., Mirow, supra note 2, at 193 (“‘[O]wners can do anything they like with 
what they own . . . .  [And] the owner is perfectly free to do nothing at all with the thing:  in 
principle, the law of property imposes no positive duties on an owner.’” (quoting F.H. 
LAWSON & BERNARD RUDDEN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 90 (3d ed. 2002))).  Similarly, when 
Blackstone famously described property as sole and despotic dominion, he prefaced the 
thought with the universalist proposition that nothing “so generally strikes the imagination, 
and engages the affections of mankind.” 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *2. 
 28. See HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY:  VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS, at xvii (2011). 
 29. See DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 66. 
 30. See Mirow, supra note 2, at 200–01. 
 31. Quoted in PAUL OLIVER, DWELLINGS:  THE VERNACULAR HOUSE WORLD WIDE 9 
(2003). 
 32. THOMAS CARTER & ELIZABETH COLLINS CROMLEY, INVITATION TO VERNACULAR 
ARCHITECTURE:  A GUIDE TO THE STUDY OF ORDINARY BUILDINGS AND LANDSCAPES 8 
(2005). 
 33. See generally BERNARD RUDOFSKY, ARCHITECTURE WITHOUT ARCHITECTS:  A SHORT 
INTRODUCTION TO NON-PEDIGREED ARCHITECTURE (1964). 
 34. OLIVER, supra note 31, at 11 (quoting Sybil Moholy-Nagy); see also Roderick J. 
Lawrence, Learning from the Vernacular:  Basic Principles for Sustaining Human Habitats, 
in VERNACULAR ARCHITECTURE IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY:  THEORY, EDUCATION AND 
PRACTICE 110 (Lindsay Asquith & Marcel Vellinga eds., 2006) (“Vernacular buildings are 
human constructs that result from the interrelations between ecological, economic, material, 
political and social factors.”). 
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function in property law.  Every society must confront certain recurring 
points of tension inherent in private property.  These include the balance 
between individual freedom, collective responsibility, and limitations on 
harm, as well as incentives for productive activity, recognition of personal 
connection to property, and others.  Society confronts these tensions 
through the resolution of individual disputes, with legal institutions that 
inherently draw on the values and imperatives of a given historical context.  
As a result, there is no singular social function—there cannot be—and no 
possibility of a transcendent, unified theory of what that function should be.  
Rather every legal system must perpetually balance the plural values 
represented in property.  There may be some continuity and stability in the 
institutional arrangements instantiated through property,35
When the vernacular is channeled through professional elites, it can 
produce a hybrid that melds instinct and expertise, with indigeneity 
incorporating broader influences.  Frank Lloyd Wright’s supposedly ur-
domestic U.S. prairie architecture, for example, borrowed from the British 
Arts and Crafts movement and traditional Japanese architecture.
 but as with 
material resources and local conditions in architecture, the process of 
contestation leaves a vernacular residue on those structures that reveal 
starkly localized resolutions. 
36  So too, 
when legal institutions struggle to make sense of the felt needs of a culture 
at a given moment, are spontaneous resolutions channeled through 
professional norms.  Nonetheless, the process still involves culture taking 
the raw materials available to it and making pragmatic accommodations that 
settle into recognizable patterns.37
Duguit, grounded in early twentieth-century Continental culture, 
understood property’s social function to mean social solidarity or 
interdependence.
 
38  He posited a kind of historical progression in which 
subjective right had given way in “modern communities”39 to the “ever-
stricter interdependence of the various elements that compose the social 
community.”40
 
 35. Cf. Nestor M. Davidson, Standardization and Pluralism in Property Law, 61 VAND. 
L. REV. 1597, 1644–55 (2008) (discussing property forms as stable platforms for legal 
innovation). 
  Duguit understood social solidarity as a question of role 
differentiation, and he argued that the unique place that owners occupy in 
society generates an obligation to put property to productive use.  As 
Duguit framed it, an owner, 
 36. See HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC:  READINGS IN THE AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC NATIONALIST 
TRADITION, at xx (Michael Lind ed., 1997). 
 37. Methodologically, analogizing the emergence of the social function to a kind of 
vernacular echoes Bruce Ackerman’s “ordinary observer” perspective on property. See 
BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE CONSTITUTION 10–20 (1977).  The 
analogy, however, recognizes more contingency to the norms reflected in the resolution of 
property conflicts than Ackerman did. 
 38. See DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 75 (citing the sociological work of Emile Durkheim); 
see also Mirow, supra note 2, at 202 (discussing Durkheim’s influence on Duguit). 
 39. DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 129. 
 40. Id. 
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by reason simply of his possession, is enabled thereby to accomplish a 
certain work where others can not.  He alone can increase the general 
stock of wealth by putting his capital to use.  For social reasons he is 
under a duty, therefore, to perform this work and society will protect his 
acts only if he accomplishes it and in the measure in which he 
accomplishes it.41
As those norms have emerged, modern social obligation theorists in the 
United States have begun exploring the duties of ownership.  Joseph Singer, 
for example, has focused on obligations that flow from reliance and the 
embedded nature of social relations.
 
42  For Gregory Alexander, the social 
obligation norm in the United States is best understood in light of a 
normative commitment to human flourishing.43  In application of this 
commitment, Alexander focuses on what he described as “collective 
restrictions of property interests,”44 with paradigm examples found in 
nonconsensual transfers and use restrictions.45
These are important correctives to classic liberal absolutism and healthy 
reminders of the pluralism of the social function in the United States, but 
they tend not to focus on what Sheila Foster and Daniel Bonilla call 
Duguit’s normative commitment to a “‘rule of productivity.’”
 
46  Duguit 
himself acknowledged that, notwithstanding his commitment to empiricism, 
he could point to little evidence of his social solidarity view in practice in 
contemporary law.47
II.  A HAMILTONIAN VERNACULAR 
  But in the early development of property law in the 
United States, in the era between the Revolution and the Civil War, there 
was in active practice a vein in the jurisprudence that reflected this very 
imperative. 
The vernacular understanding of property as carrying an obligation 
toward productivity reflects a tradition that can be traced back to the 
balance that Alexander Hamilton sought to strike between civic obligation 
and individual initiative.  Hamilton can certainly be described, as he was by 
a recent biographer, as “the prophet of the capitalist revolution,”48
 
 41. Id. at 133–34. 
 but 
Hamiltonian dynamism reflected a conception of social obligation that 
 42. See generally Singer, supra note 3. 
 43. See generally Alexander, supra note 3. 
 44. Id. at 752. 
 45. See id. at 775–91 (canvassing what Alexander describes as “entitlement sacrifices” 
and “use sacrifices”). 
 46. See Foster & Bonilla, supra note 2, at 1005. 
 47. DUGUIT, supra note 1, at 135 (“The objection does not embarrass me.  From the fact 
that the law does not yet directly force the owner to cultivate his land or repair his houses or 
utilize his capital, it cannot be concluded that the idea of social function has not yet 
supplanted the idea of a subjective right of property.”).  Duguit’s answer to this objection 
was that no such law had appeared because the need had not yet arisen. Id.  How that 
puzzling absence justified his view of the actual social function of ownership embodied in 
law is not clear. 
 48. RON CHERNOW, ALEXANDER HAMILTON 6 (2004). 
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actively sought to harness ownership by disrupting the established order 
where necessary and fostering productive property over entrenchment. 
A.  Hamilton’s Vision in the Federalist Papers and the Reports 
As with all members of the Founding generation, it is perilous to attempt 
to tie a singular strain in U.S. intellectual history to Hamilton.  As Jefferson 
famously wrote of Hamilton, “without numbers, he is an host within 
himself.”49  Hamilton certainly cast a certain jaundiced eye on human 
nature and had little faith in the virtues of an engaged citizenry, accepting 
generally that prosperity required engaging those already endowed with 
wealth.50  Hamilton is thus easy to pillory as a closet aristocrat and some 
kind of unreconstructed mercantilist, but his ideas about the state’s nature 
were, like those of his contemporaries, more nuanced.  While not every 
element of this tradition traces directly to Hamilton’s writings and the 
policies he advocated, certain core principles can be identified with the 
Founding Father who most directly advocated a vigorous central 
government to transform the United States from an agricultural colony into 
an “Empire of Commerce.”51
Hamilton authored roughly two-thirds of the Federalist Papers, and his 
views on harnessing entrepreneurial energy were evident in his case for a 
strong national government.  For example, in Federalist No. 12, Hamilton 
defended the proposed federal government’s power to tax and to impose 
duties on imports, arguing that the “prosperity of commerce is now 
perceived and acknowledged by all enlightened statesmen to be the most 
useful as well as the most productive source of national wealth.”
 
52  
Likewise, in Federalist No. 30, Hamilton argued that “money is, with 
propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that which 
sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential 
functions.”53
It was in Hamilton’s work as Treasury Secretary that his vision of the 
entrepreneurial state, with its implications for property, came most fully 
into view.  In a series of seminal reports and opinions he authored in 1790 
and 1791,
  Hamilton saw the confluence of public good and market 
incentives, but did so in the context of a polemic in favor of a vigorous 
government that would put these incentives to use to forge a new nation. 
54
 
 49. Quoted in ROSSITER, supra note 
 Hamilton articulated a fiscal policy built on his forceful 
22, at 3. 
 50. See Katz, supra note 13, at 485–86 (quoting Hamilton’s argument before the New 
York Ratifying Convention that the “vices” of the “wealthy” are “probably more favorable 
to the prosperity of the state, than those of the indigent; and partake less of moral 
depravity”). 
 51. ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 75. 
 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 53. THE FEDERALIST NO. 30 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 54. Hurst cites a corpus of work from 1790 and 1791 that outlined Hamilton’s vision 
while Secretary of the Treasury:  the Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public 
Credit, which advocated funding national and state debts; the First Report on the Further 
Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit, on a federal excise tax; the Second 
Report on the Further Provision Necessary for Establishing Public Credit, recommending a 
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interpretation of national powers to tax, spend, borrow, and provide a 
money supply.55
In his Report Relative to a Provision for the Support of Public Credit, for 
example, Hamilton argued that funding public securities was necessary to 
create a liquid money supply, which would then energize private capital for 
the benefit of the new nation.
  In each of these areas, Hamilton framed his policies in 
terms of the potential for a vigorous national government to play a unique 
role in generating private capital, diversifying the nation’s economic base, 
protecting fledgling domestic industries, making strategic investments in 
public goods, and, throughout, harnessing these interventions to expand the 
resources available for future growth. 
56  Public debt, supported through the taxing 
power, would serve as security for private borrowing that would otherwise 
never materialize.  Hamilton saw the impending failure of a central sector 
of the new economy and crafted an aggressive plan to shore up what would 
have otherwise been a crippling credit crisis.57
Likewise, in his Report on the Subject of Manufactures, Hamilton 
articulated the need for strong protection for an industrial economy, 
borrowing Adam Smith’s division of labor theory and using it to build the 
case for an active state role.
 
58  To Hamilton, supporting manufacturing in a 
then-agricultural economy would “not only occasion a possitive [sic] 
augmentation of the Produce and Revenue of the Society,” but also 
“contribute essentially to rendering them greater than they could possibly 
be without such [support].”59  Hamilton’s argument rested on specialization 
and the use of technology that would engage a broader base of employment 
and encourage immigration.60  This, in turn, would best utilize the range of 
talents in society, create a greater scope for enterprise, and (so the politician 
in Hamilton had to note for a skeptical agrarian audience) increase the value 
of agriculture.61
 
national bank, and a corresponding opinion rendered at request of the President on the 
constitutionality of legislation to create a national bank; and, finally, the Report on the 
Subject of Manufactures, advocating a pro-manufacturing federal policy. See Hurst, supra 
note 
  To these ends, Hamilton advocated a range of trade, tax, 
16, at 488. 
 55. See id. at 489–90. 
 56. THE REPORT RELATIVE TO A PROVISION FOR THE SUPPORT OF PUBLIC CREDIT (Jan. 14, 
1791) [hereinafter REPORT ON PUBLIC CREDIT], reprinted in 6 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER 
HAMILTON 65 [hereinafter PAH]. 
 57. Hamilton grounded his argument, particularly for funding at face value debts that 
might have been purchased at steep discounts, in part on the value of certainty for holders of 
debt. See id. at 73–78.  Hamilton thus certainly understood instrumental reasons for the 
sanctity of property at the same time his policies presaged a massive shift from older, land-
based forms of wealth to new property based on manufacturing and financial assets. 
 58. See supra note 22. 
 59. REPORT ON THE SUBJECT OF MANUFACTURES (Dec. 5, 1971), reprinted in 10 PAH 
249. 
 60. Id.  Hamilton did argue that one advantage of manufacturing was that it would 
enable women and children, “persons who would otherwise be idle (and in many cases a 
burthen on the community),” to come more easily into the workforce. Id. at 253.  Needless to 
say, this advocacy for the labor of children (“many of them,” Hamilton noted with favor, “of 
a very tender age,” id.) is anachronistic, but was hardly out of the ordinary in the eighteenth 
century. 
 61. Id. at 249. 
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and investment policies, including internal improvements, direct subsidies, 
research support, and import protections.62
Hamilton’s functionalism reflected his grave doubts about the ability of 
market forces to fulfill their function, particularly in a new nation 
competing with strong foreign powers.  As Hamilton argued in his Report 
on the Subject of Manufactures, there were “very cogent reasons” to believe 
that industry needed federal assistance, given 
 
the strong influence of habit and the spirit of imitation—the fear of want 
of success in untried enterprises—the intrinsic difficulties incident to first 
essays towards a competition with those who have previously attained to 
perfection in the business to be attempted—the bounties premiums and 
other artificial encouragements, with which foreign nations second the 
exertions of their own Citizens in the branches, in which they are to be 
rivalled.63
What emerges from the range of Hamilton’s work in this era is a vision 
that drew on the power of an active, vigorous state to guide, protect, and 
structure the market to foster, quite literally, the common wealth.
 
64  This 
was not a vision—for all of Hamilton’s recognition of the instrumental 
value of honoring the public debt (and the sanctity of contract more 
generally)—that inherently privileged vested rights in order to promote a 
market economy as such, but rather that favored entrepreneurship and 
productivity.  This vision had implications for the construction of property 
law in the United States.65  Ownership was not a passive activity or a basis 
for preserving social order, but rather an affirmative tool to harness 
entrepreneurship for the sake of collective development.66
In advancing Hamilton’s policies, with the creation of a national bank, 
the assumption of Revolutionary Era state debt, and the funding of federal 
debt, the objects of property were expanded from land to more abstract, 
 
 
 62. See generally id. 
 63. Id. at 266. 
 64. Hamilton may have personally favored more libertarian approaches to the market, 
but his pragmatism recognized the necessity of intervention.  In 1801, Hamilton responded 
to critics of his plans by noting that 
[t]o suggestions of the last kind, the adepts of the new-school have a ready answer:  
Industry will succeed and prosper in proportion as it is left to the exertions of 
individual enterprise.  This favorite dogma, when taken as a general rule, is true; 
but as an exclusive one, it is false, and leads to error in the administration of public 
affairs.  In matters of industry, human enterprise ought, doubtless, to be left free in 
the main, not fettered by too much regulation; but practical politicians know that it 
may be beneficially stimulated by prudent aids and encouragements on the part of 
the Government. 
THE EXAMINATION NO. III (Dec. 24, 1801), reprinted in 25 PAH 467. 
 65. On an abstract level, the Hamiltonian program was explicitly utilitarian. See GERALD 
STOURZH, ALEXANDER HAMILTON AND THE IDEA OF REPUBLICAN GOVERNMENT 25 (1970) 
(quoting Hamilton’s observation that “utility is the prime end of all laws”).  The exercise in 
this Essay, however, is not to limn a generalist approach to property but rather to undertake 
something of the opposite:  to work from traces in the U.S. discourse of property to isolate 
one vernacular understanding of a social function. 
 66. See Hurst, supra note 16, at 522–33 (discussing Hamilton’s view that advancing the 
national public interest required accepting a measure of benefit to certain elements of the 
private sector, particularly entrepreneurs, over others). 
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mobile, dynamic sources of wealth.  In Hamilton’s broader program of 
economic development through finance and infrastructure investments, 
moreover, there was recognition of the intertwining of individual initiative 
and state support.  Instrumentally, property was not sacrosanct for its own 
sake; rather, Hamilton’s vision required the active use of property and a 
national government that could match that ambition.67  It has frequently 
been noted that Hamilton’s vision, of all of the Founders, most prefigured 
the modern state into which the United States grew,68
B.  Commonwealth and the Release of Energy as a Social Function 
 and this 
understanding of the active harnessing of individual initiative was a 
distinctive, novel conception at the time. 
The kernels of the productivity social function that Hamilton sought to 
unleash grew widely in property law in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, as the developing nation embraced doctrines that shaped ownership 
to advance an understanding of the common good that included an 
affirmative obligation to use resources productively.69
 
 67. As Willard Hurst noted, “Hamilton believed with wholehearted fervor that the public 
interest required not simply a national government well endowed with authority, but a 
government in hands that would use that authority with creative energy.” Id. at 486.  It is 
beyond the scope of this Essay to elaborate on the intersection between what Hamilton’s 
vision meant for property and federalism.  Suffice it to say that Hamilton had a distinctly 
national perspective while, in the antebellum period, much of the locus of property doctrine 
that reflected the social vision Hamilton articulated was at the state level. 
  Across a number of 
domains, property law and policy recognized an imperative that reversed 
the Lockean labor–reward paradigm.  Instead of being granted property 
 68. See, e.g., HAMILTON’S REPUBLIC, supra note 36, at xiv (“[H]owever powerful 
Jeffersonian rhetoric remains in American public discourse, it is the Hamiltonians who have 
won the major struggles to determine what kind of country the United States would be.”). 
 69. Cf. Dennis J. Coyle, Takings Jurisprudence and the Political Cultures of American 
Politics, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 817, 830 (1993) (noting that for Hamilton, property rights were 
instrumentally linked to what Hurst would call the “release of energy,” harnessing the self-
interested pursuit of wealth for national development). 
  This is not to suggest that structuring private property to recognize an affirmative 
obligation to utilize property for the collective benefit of the community began with 
Hamilton.  It was a central feature of property law in the Colonial era as well.  As John Hart 
noted: 
Colonial lawmakers often regulated private landowners’ usage of their land in 
order to secure public benefits, not merely to prevent harm to health and safety.  
Indeed, the public benefits pursued by such legislative action included some that 
consisted essentially of benefits for other private landowners.  Legislatures often 
attempted to influence or control the development of land for particular productive 
purposes thought to be in the public good.  Legislatures compelled owners of 
undeveloped land to develop it, beyond what was required by the original grants, 
and compelled owners of wetlands to participate in drainage projects.  Owners 
risked losing preexisting mineral rights if they failed to conduct their mining with 
sufficient promptness.  Owners of land suitable for iron forges risked losing their 
land if they declined to erect such forges themselves.  In towns and cities, 
landowners were constrained by measures intended to channel the spatial pattern 
of development, to optimize the density of habitation, to promote development of 
certain kinds of land, and to implement aesthetic goals. 
John F. Hart, Colonial Land Use Law and Its Significance for Modern Takings Doctrine, 109 
HARV. L. REV. 1252, 1257 (1996). 
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rights in recognition of work done in a pre-political, natural-rights sense, 
property rights were recognized upon the condition—implied or explicit—
that work must be done.70
As Willard Hurst famously described this ethos, it was not “the jealous 
limitation of the power of the state, but the release of individual creative 
energy that was the dominant value.”
 
71  Thus, where “legal regulation or 
compulsion might promote the greater release of . . . energ[y],” 
policymakers in the United States “had no hesitancy in making affirmative 
use of law.”72  As Hurst put it, “[T]here was nothing merely negative about 
the tone of life in the nineteenth-century United States. . . .  We were a 
people going places in a hurry.  Men in that frame of mind are not likely to 
be thinking only of the condition of their brakes.”73  Thus, the focus of the 
law was not on “protecting those who sought the law’s shelter simply for 
what they had; our enthusiasm ran rather to those who wanted the law’s 
help positively to bring things about.”74
Hurst cites, for example, the way that bankruptcy law, which developed 
originally to protect creditors, came to emphasize instead the means through 
which debtors could be rehabilitated to venture in business again.
 
75  
Similarly, debtor relief legislation and corporate franchise cases in this era 
sacrificed vested rights in favor of state action to foster further enterprise.  
Hurst quotes Justice Taney’s decision in Charles River Bridge v. Warren 
Bridge,76 which he describes as capturing this gestalt of “property as an 
institution of growth rather than merely of security.”77
Cases throughout the early nineteenth century resolved conflicts between 
more or less productive uses of common resources in ways that 
subordinated vested rights.  This can be seen, for example, in mill cases 
where courts in the nineteenth century began validating the right of private 
millers to flood neighboring land without consent (albeit with 
 
 
 70. Eric Claeys has argued for a kind of Lockean account of property grounded in what 
he sees as purposive use that satisfies life conveniences, as opposed to an absolute right to 
exclude. See Eric R. Claeys, Jefferson Meets Coase:  Land-Use Torts, Law and Economics, 
and Natural Property Rights, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1379, 1398–404 (2010).  It is beyond 
the scope of this Essay to engage directly with Claeys’ argument; it is worth noting, 
however, the apparent tension within the natural rights tradition between absolutism and 
dynamism, in light of the strains in early U.S. property law that favored the productive 
impulse over exclusionary norms. 
 71. HURST, supra note 21, at 7. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. at 9. 
 74. Id. at 10. 
 75. Id. at 26. 
 76. 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
 77. HURST, supra note 21, at 27–28 (“‘While the rights of private property are sacredly 
guarded, we must not forget, that the community also have rights; and that the happiness and 
well-being of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation.’” (quoting Charles River 
Bridge, 36 U.S. at 422)).  This view about the centrality of productivity in this era is not 
without its critics. See Harry N. Scheiber, At the Borderland of Law and Economic History:  
The Contributions of Willard Hurst, 75 AM. HIST. REV. 744, 752 (1970); see also 
ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 185–210 (challenging Hurst’s narrative).  This is a reminder 
that the productivity obligation was by no means the only approach to property during that 
era and that this historical record is far from self-evident. 
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compensation), and later expanded this right to a variety of manufacturing 
enterprises.78  In water law more generally, common law doctrines that 
protected owners against interference with resources in their natural 
conditions began to yield to conceptions of reasonable use and public 
benefit with an explicitly pro-development orientation.79
A similar theme runs through the delegation of the eminent domain 
power to private industry and the broader recognition of a private right of 
condemnation in some states.
 
80  As Harry Scheiber argued, courts across 
the country in the first half of the nineteenth century validated the 
delegation of eminent domain power on “turnpike, bridge, canal, and 
railroad companies.”81  Courts had also recognized a variety of facilitating 
doctrines that made the use of eminent domain by the state easier, including 
offsets to lower the cost of delegated condemnation and the power to alter 
the scope of projects once commenced, notwithstanding objections from 
neighbors.82  Private delegations of eminent domain carried these powers 
with them, Scheiber notes.83
Public infrastructure, much of it developed through mixed public and 
private enterprises, also invoked the common good to foster active use of 
property in the face of assertions that such use interfered with existing 
rights.  For example, what William Novak described as the “early American 
transportation revolution” came with doctrines such as injunctions against 
interference with public lands and ways and uncompensated damage—
damnum absque injuria—where public infrastructure caused consequential 
harm to private property.
 
84
Hamiltonian dynamism was reflected in early public land policy as well, 
where congressional acceptance of the western lands previously held by 
Virginia and the Louisiana Purchase brought the federal government into 
possession of vast tracts of land.
 
85  The policy of alienating public lands is 
often understood as either expanding the class of landholders in a 
Jeffersonian vein or as privatizing the public domain.86  Hamilton sought to 
dispose of public lands in large part to raise revenue,87
 
 78. See generally Harry N. Scheiber, Property Law, Expropriation, and Resource 
Allocation by Government:  The United States, 1789–1910, 33 J. ECON. HIST. 232 (1973). 
 but also to develop 
an explicitly national community and ensure the most advantageous use of 
that community’s collective resources.  Again, private ownership in this 
disposition was tied to a bargain in that it relied on productivity.  This thrust 
of national public lands policy expanded in the early decades of the 
nineteenth century, as federal public lands were used not only for direct 
 79. See MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780–1860, at 
32–33 (1977). 
 80. See Scheiber, supra note 78, at 235–40. 
 81. Id. at 237. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 128–29. 
 85. See Paul W. Gates, An Overview of American Land Policy, 50 AGRIC. HIST. 213, 219 
(1976); Hurst, supra note 16, at 536 n.140. 
 86. See, e.g., McEvoy, supra note 17, at 96–97. 
 87. See generally Gates, supra note 85. 
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development, but also for creating the infrastructure necessary to release 
individual initiative, including support for education, interstate commerce, 
and active migration.88
Across the range of doctrines, commonwealth norms and the salus populi 
principle were understood to be internal, inherent aspects of property, not 
external impositions on an otherwise well-demarcated private sphere.
 
89  
Thus, the needs of the community were intrinsic to law’s recognition of 
property rights, with courts comfortably recognizing a variety of regulatory 
and developmental imperatives.90
In short, in the early development of property law in the United States, an 
organic perspective emerged under which an active government intervened 
to foster growth and favor entrepreneurship over entrenchment.  This all-
too-brief excursion flattens a great deal of rich history, and sidesteps myriad 
debates about the forces that shaped these norms in property law.  Indeed, 
this strain in the jurisprudence has been examined by legal historians for 
what it reveals about interest group politics, democratic theory, and the 
history of regulation, among other perspectives.  It can also be understood, 
however, as a vernacular social function that, for all of its controversy, 
represented a contextual response to the felt necessities of a newly 
developing nation. 
 
III.  CONTEMPORARY ECHOES OF A HAMILTONIAN SOCIAL FUNCTION 
In the contemporary dialectic between property as negative liberty and 
the obligations of ownership, the harnessing of individual energy by an 
active state for the good of the community has faded as a distinctive, 
articulated trope.  In practice, however, a vision of property that 
affirmatively harnesses ownership for collective development has never 
really gone away in the United States.91
These historical echoes, for example, may provide a way to understand 
the pedigree of current controversies over the use of eminent domain for 
economic development upheld in Kelo v. City of New London.
 
92
 
 88. Id. 
  In their 
 89. See NOVAK, supra note 4, at 9–10, 21–22. 
 90. Id. at 21. 
 91. This discussion moves from early nineteenth-century property developments to the 
present day without delving into the many significant developments in between.  It remains 
conventional wisdom that the Supreme Court in the period between the Civil War and the 
New Deal constitutionalized much of the classical liberal view of property, although the 
cross-currents were much more complex than a simple formalist turn, and earlier 
commonwealth conceptions continued to play a significant role in property law. See 
ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 248–76.  Likewise, post-New Deal acceptance of the limits of 
property rights in the modern administrative state has been a prevailing, but not absolute, 
sentiment, and the pull of classical conceptions remains strong.  Nonetheless, it should 
suffice to note that the developmental imperative that seemed so evident in the early 
evolution of property law in the United States tends to receive less attention in contemporary 
debates. 
 92. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).  In Kelo, the Supreme Court reviewed the constitutionality 
under the Public Use Clause of the exercise of the power of eminent domain delegated to the 
New London Development Corporation, a private, non-profit community development 
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dissents in Kelo, both Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas emphasized the 
violence to fundamental norms of private property that they saw in the 
decision.  As Justice O’Connor phrased it, the Kelo majority abandoned the 
“long-held, basic limitation on government power” that bars a compensated 
transfer from one private owner to another “who will use it in a way that the 
legislature deems more beneficial to the public.”93  Justice Thomas went 
even further, arguing that the Framers had embodied in the Fifth 
Amendment Blackstone’s assertion that “‘the law of the 
land . . . postpone[s] even public necessity to the sacred and inviolable 
rights of private property.’”94
The Kelo majority, and to a certain extent Justice Kennedy in his 
concurrence, responded to these assertions by emphasizing the importance 
of judicial deference and the political process underpinnings of 
governmental discretion.
 
95  Another way to understand what Kelo 
represents, however, can be found in Justice Stevens’s citation to 
nineteenth- and early twentieth-century cases involving disputes over 
resistance to governmental support for private development.  To bolster his 
interpretation of the Court’s longstanding view of the breadth of public use, 
Justice Stevens cited early mill cases that allowed private developers to 
flood neighbors,96 cases involving private takings to promote the working 
of important industries,97 and other examples of private productive use 
favored in law over assertions of the right to exclude or to be free from 
other interference.98
 
organization.  The Corporation had been tasked with redeveloping the economically 
distressed Fort Trumbull neighborhood at the center of New London, Connecticut from a 
largely residential neighborhood into a mixed-use development. See id. at 473–75. 
 
 93. Id. at 494 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
 94. Id. at 505 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *135); 
see also id. at 510 (“Blackstone rejected the idea that private property could be taken solely 
for purposes of any public benefit.  ‘So great . . . is the regard of the law for private 
property,’ he explained, ‘that it will not authorize the least violation of it; no, not even for the 
general good of the whole community.’” (quoting 1 BLACKSTONE, supra note 27, at *135)). 
 95. Id. at 477–78 (majority opinion) (noting that although it would violate the Public 
Use Clause “to take property under the mere pretext of a public purpose, when its actual 
purpose was to bestow a private benefit,” the exercise of eminent domain in Kelo would 
have been “executed pursuant to a ‘carefully considered’ development plan”); id. at 491 
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (“A court confronted with a plausible accusation of impermissible 
favoritism to private parties should treat the objection as a serious one and review the record 
to see if it has merit . . . .”). 
 96. See id. at 479 n.8 (majority opinion) (citing Philip Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of 
Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U. L. REV. 615, 619–24 (1940)). 
 97. See id. (“‘The mining and milling interests give employment to many men, and the 
benefits derived from this business are distributed as much, and sometimes more, among the 
laboring classes than with the owners of the mines and mills. . . .  The present prosperity of 
the state is entirely due to the mining developments already made, and the entire people of 
the state are directly interested in having the future developments unobstructed by the 
obstinate action of any individual or individuals.’” (quoting Dayton Gold & Silver Mining 
Co. v. Seawell, 11 Nev. 394, 409–10 (1876))). 
 98. See id. at 480 (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold Mining Co. 200 U.S. 527, 
531–32 (1906) (affirming a mining company’s transport of ore over another’s private 
property); Fallbrook Irrigation Dist. v. Bradley, 164 U.S. 112, 158–64 (1896) (upholding an 
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These cases are significant not because they support the outcome in Kelo, 
which was doctrinally unremarkable in light of modern public use 
jurisprudence stretching back more than half a century.99
It is fair to ask what can normatively justify the sacrifices that the 
plaintiffs in Kelo were required to make.
  Instead, they are 
significant because they reaffirm the continuity of the essentially 
Hamiltonian insight about the obligation of owners to advance the 
commonwealth in a particular entrepreneurially oriented way.  Thus, 
collective decisions to force the productive use of property—to obligate 
owners to expand the common resources available to the community—are 
at least as deeply rooted in U.S. culture as the Lockean absolutism that sent 
Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas into paroxysms in their dissents. 
100
Framed as a vernacular U.S. understanding of the obligations of 
ownership, it is possible to see Hamiltonian echoes in other current 
property-related policy disputes beyond local economic development.  
Controversies over the Federal Communications Commission’s (FCC) 
allocation of rights to the electromagnetic spectrum, for example, have been 
compared to similar questions about the balance between market forces and 
private entitlements in public lands.
  The point here is not to defend 
the merits of what New London did in prioritizing the potential to create 
greater opportunity in a severely economically distressed community over 
the plaintiffs’ attachment to their homes.  Rather, the point is to recognize 
that an understanding of the obligations of ownership that privileges 
productive use has a long pedigree in the culture of property in the United 
States. 
101  As the FCC is now contemplating 
reallocating spectrum from broadcast television to more productive wireless 
communications services,102 the FCC’s arguments for the public interest in 
redirecting this resource, staked by certain incumbents, toward more 
productive use is supporting active ownership in a way that would likely 
have sounded familiar to Hamilton.103
Federal investments in the predicates for national growth and the 
productive use of property in a Hamiltonian vein continue to meet claims of 
 
 
irrigation district’s sale for the nonpayment of assessments of an owner unwillingly included 
in the district)). 
 99. See Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954) (“Subject to specific constitutional 
limitations, when the legislature has spoken, the public interest has been declared in terms 
well-nigh conclusive.”). 
 100. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 3, at 781–82. 
 101. See, e.g., Harold J. Krent & Nicholas S. Zeppos, Monitoring Governmental 
Disposition of Assets:  Fashioning Regulatory Substitutes for Market Controls, 52 VAND. L. 
REV. 1705 (1999). 
 102. See Innovation in the Broad. Television Bands:  Allocations, Channel Sharing & 
Improvements to VHF, 19 FCC Rcd. 16,498 (Nov. 30, 2010) (notice of proposed 
rulemaking). 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 16,502 (“It is essential to our nation’s economic future that the 
demand for a robust mobile broadband infrastructure is met.”).  Not surprisingly, spectrum 
reallocation has sparked age-old arguments about the threat to vested rights and existing 
entitlements. See Edward Wyatt, A Clash over the Airways, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2011, at 
B1. 
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undue interference with private property.104  High-speed interstate rail lines, 
green infrastructure such as a new national energy grid and energy retrofit 
financing, federal investments in education, and many other policies are 
contemporary echoes of the vision of an engaged national community 
intervening to push markets toward collectively beneficial outcomes.105  
Indeed, national attention remains focused on stimulus policy as a whole,106 
which is a continuing source of controversy.107
In the end, solutions that policymakers reach for in pragmatically solving 
recurring problems continue to inform our understanding of the social 
function of property.  In the broader culture, commentators have argued for 
the continuing relevance of a distinctive tradition that stretches back to 
Hamilton,
 
108
CONCLUSION 
 and that tradition carries with it a correspondingly distinctive 
vision of the obligations of ownership that has been a part of the U.S. 
discourse, for better or worse, from the outset. 
The idea of the social function of property does not yet come easily to 
mind when discussing property in the United States, although that is 
beginning to change.  Substantively, however, Duguit’s conception of the 
obligation to put property to productive use for the sake of social solidarity 
is not entirely unfamiliar in the U.S. culture of property.  This Essay’s 
rough sketch of a Hamiltonian tradition that includes an impulse towards 
productivity does not, of course, map on to Duguit’s perspective in all of its 
particulars, which is hardly surprising.  To take seriously the imbedded 
nature of the social function means looking less for universal norms and 
more for the granularity of the solutions that a given culture develops to a 
set of particular challenges.  Nonetheless, the extent to which this strain in 
the jurisprudence resonates with the essential elements of Duguit’s 
understanding is striking.109
 
 104. See, e.g., Charles Rowley, Socialism, Not Keynesian Economics, Motivates the 
Obama Administration, CHARLES ROWLEY’S BLOG (July 12, 2010, 5:37 PM), http://
charlesrowley.wordpress.com/2010/07/12/socialism-not-keynesian-economics-motivates-
the-obama-administration/. 
  In this tradition, the good of the community 
and the commonwealth were inherent in the meaning of property, not 
imposed on a pre-political right, which meant that ownership included 
 105. This is not to claim the broad sweep of Keynesian economic policy for the realm of 
the Hamiltonian tradition, but rather to highlight a few contemporary flashpoints with 
parallels to Hamilton’s developmental program. 
 106. See, e.g., Michael Cragg & Joseph E. Stiglitz, Should the Government Invest, or Try 
to Spur Private Investment?, 8 ECONOMISTS’ VOICE 1 (2011). 
 107. See, e.g., Editorial, The Stimulus Tragedy, WALL ST. J., Feb. 7–8, 2009, at A10. 
 108. See Debate, The Two-Party System Is Making America Ungovernable, INTELLIGENCE 
SQUARED U.S. (Feb. 15, 2011, 7:13 PM), http://intelligencesquaredus.org/wp-
content/uploads/Two-party-021511.pdf (statement of David Brooks) (“[W]e’ve got two 
parties in this country, but we’ve got three movements.  The first . . . believes in using 
government to enhance equality.  The second. . . believes in limited government to enhance 
freedom.  But starting . . . with Alexander Hamilton . . . [another] believed in limited but 
energetic government to enhance social mobility, to give people the tools to compete.”). 
 109. See Foster & Bonilla, supra note 2, at 1008–10. 
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affirmative obligations, among which was a kind of dynamism that favored 
productivity. 
Identifying this entrepreneurial approach to dynamic property as a U.S. 
vernacular social function is not to defend its normative desirability.  It is a 
point well taken that focusing on increasing the resources available to the 
community obscures the important distributional questions that must 
follow.110  There is much to be said, moreover, for the alienation that can 
flow from alienability,111 and the harms—social and environmental—that a 
developmental imperative can bring are manifest.112
 
  But those appropriate 
notes of caution should not obscure the comparative point that in grappling 
with what the social function of property might mean in the U.S. context, it 
is instructive to find echoes of Duguit and remember that for all of the 
particular distinctiveness of each legal culture, there are commonalities as 
well. 
 
 110. See Alexander, supra note 3, at 778 n.127 (“‘[A] gain in social wealth, considered 
just in itself and apart from its costs or other good or bad consequences, is no gain at all.’” 
(quoting RONALD DWORKIN, A MATTER OF PRINCIPLE 246 (1985)). 
 111. See ALEXANDER, supra note 6, at 35–36. 
 112. See, e.g., John Sprankling, The Antiwilderness Bias in American Property Law, 63 
U. CHI. L. REV. 519, 569, 584–86 (1996). 
